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any police interrogation. Footnote 35 guarantees the accused this advice by
providing him with the right to counsel in such circumstances.
It should be noted that while New York already provides for this inde-
pendent right to counsel, under the Donovan and Gunner decisions, the right is
severely limited to only those defendants who have either retained or requested
counsel. However there would seem to be little reason in a society like ours to
require a man to request those rights guaranteed him by the Constitution.1
Moreover, such a concept was expressly condemned in Miranda when the right
to counsel is used as a protective device for the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, on the grounds that the requirement of request discriminates against those
defendants who are not aware of their constitutional rights3
2
Miranda also provides no guidance in answering such questions as whether
statements made by the accused were spontaneous or the product of interrogation,
whether non-testimonial evidence introduced at trial is the fruit of statements
made during a prohibited interrogation, and also, what constitutes a significant
deprivation of liberty .so as to require the Miranda warnings. This last
question is of special importance to New York in light of its "Stop and Frisk"78
statute which expressly permits the police "to stop any person abroad in a
public place ... and ... demand of him his name, address, and an explanation
of his actions. ' 'r4 The state police have been officially advised that Miranda
does not require them to warn suspects, detained under this statute, of their
constitutional rights.7 5 However this issue must ultimately be decided by the
United States Supreme Court on the basis of whether a person so detained "has
been deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."
GARY M. COHEN
DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS-INcoRPORATION BY REF-
ERENCE-CONDITIONAL BEQUEST RENDERED ABSOLUTE BY INADMISSABILITY Or
CONTRARY DIRECTIONS
Testator bequeathed his clothing, jewelry, the remainder of his paintings,
and similar personal effects "to be distributed as I shall direct in a memorandum
to be found with this will or in my safe deposit box now at the First National
City Bank of New York... or in my office safe, or in the absence of such direc-
tions, to be distributed by my said wife or niece as she shall deem proper."1
71. Note, 15 Buffalo L. Rev. 719, 721 (1966).
72. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470, 471 (1966). See also People v. Dorado,
62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965). Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956).
73. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. 180-a.
74. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. 180-a(1).
75. McKane, Comments on Miranda v. Arizona, 1 Law Enforcement Executive (No.
2) p. 7 (1966).
1. Matter of Salmon, 24 A.D.2d 962, 265 N.Y.S.2d 373, 374 (1st Dep't 1965).
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Of the two distributees, only the niece survived him. An unattested and undated
letter was found in the testator's office safe. This letter was in the testator's
handwriting and was addressed to the testator's niece. In this document,
testator advised the niece that he would like to have certain property given to
named persons. An action was brought for a determination of the validity,
construction, and effect of this paper. The Surrogate's Court held that the
niece was entitled to take absolutely only in the complete absence of directions.
Finding that such directions did exist, although they could not be validly
incorporated by reference into the will, the court ordered that the property
pass through the residuary clause.2 On appeal, held, order modified, two judges
dissenting. The letter of directions could not be incorporated into the will. As
a result, there is an absence of legal directions and the gift to the niece becomes
absolute. Matter of Salmon, 24 A.D.2d 962, 265 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1st Dep't 1965).
Incorporation by reference is recognized by the majority of American
jurisdictions.3 Through the use of this doctrine, an extrinsic writing is permitted
to become part of the program of testamentary disposition. One major advantage
of allowing incorporation by reference is that it permits a degree of relaxation
in the rule prohibiting courts from looking beyond the four corners of the
will. 4 This relaxation provides the court with needed flexibility where a restric-
tion to the will would frustrate the intended testamentary disposition. However,
the need for this flexibility does not extend to the point of admission of all
extrinsic documents. Incorporation by reference is necessarily limited in use
and application because the unlimited allowance of extrinsic writings to effectuate
testamentary disposition conflicts with the policy of wills statutes. As a means
of avoiding a potential tidal wave of extrinsic writings, courts have sought to
restrict incorporation by reference by permitting its use only when specified
conditions have been met. These conditions are: (1) the will itself must refer
to such extrinsic document sought to be incorporated as being in existence at the
time of the execution of the will; 5 (2) the document must be reasonably
identified in the will; 6 (3) testator's intention to incorporate such instrument
in his will and to make it a part of his will must be shown; 7 (4) the document
must in fact be in existence at the time of the execution of the will; 8 and (5)
the document must correspond to the description of it in the will and must be
2. Matter of Salmon, 46 Misc. 2d 541, 260 N.Y.S.2d 66 (Surr. Ct. 1965).
3. Thompson, Wills § 106 (3d ed. 1947).
4. Samuels, Incorporation by Reference in New York Wills, 19 N.Y.UJL.Q. Rev. 270
(1941).
5. Wagner v. Clauson, 399 IDl. 403, 78 N.E.2d 203 (1948); Matter of McNamara's
Estate, 119 Cal. App. 2d 744, 260 P.2d 182 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953).
6. Matter of Protheroe, 77 S.D. 72, 85 N.W.2d 505 (1957).
7. Zimmerman v. Hafer, 81 Md. 347, 32 Ati. 316 (1895); Richardson v. Byrd, 166
S.C. 251, 164 S.E. 643 (1932).
8. Bircher v. Wasson, 133 Ind. App. 27, 180 N.E.2d 118 (1962); Montgomery v.
Blankenship, 217 Ark. 357, 230 S.W.2d 51 (1950); Kellom v. Beverstock, 100 N.H. 329,
126 A.2d 127 (1956).
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shown to be the instrument referred to.9 Substantial fulfillment of these
requirements will not suffice; all conditions must be fully complied with or the
attempted incorporation will fail.'0 This emphasis on these conditions as a
prerequisite to incorporation by reference represents an attempt to strike a
proper balance between desired flexibility and the requirements of formality
in the execution of a will.
In New York, the doctrine of incorporation by reference has had a some-
what troubled career. Judicial concern with the possibility of fraud in attempted
incorporations, i.e., permitting the testator or someone else to alter testamentary
disposition after execution of the will without compliance with the formalities
of wills statutes, led to the erroneous conclusion that the doctrine of incorpora-
tion by reference was rejected in New York. This error has resulted in the
New York courts formally denying application of incorporation by reference
while permitting it in actuality where there is little possibility of fraud.
Initially, incorporation by reference was accepted in New York until 1891,11
when the Court of Appeals decided Booth v. Baptist Church.'2 There testator
bequeathed stock which was to be selected from his securities and he stated
that a memorandum of securities which he had selected would be found among
his papers. An undated memorandum was denied effect, the Court saying, "It
is unquestionably the law of this state that an unattested paper which is of a
testamentary nature cannot be taken as a part of the will even though referred
to by that instrument."' 8 From then on, Booth was accepted as authority for
the proposition that New York rejects incorporation by reference.14 Many com-
mentators have contended that the strong language found in the Booth opinion
was dictum since the memorandum could have been held ineffective under the
conditions ordinarily applied to permit incorporation by reference.15 With the
light of incorporation by reference now eclipsed by the Booth case, the New
York courts were confronted with the prospect of either limiting testamentary
distribution to the four corners of the will or allowing the use of extrinsic docu-
ments without overruling the language of the Booth case.
A reference to the leading cases in this area shows the compromise position
which New York has adopted. Shortly before the decision in the Booth case, the
Court of Appeals had decided Matter of Piffard.16 In this case, the daughter pre-
9. Matter of Smith's Estate, 196 Cal. App. 2d 544, 16 Cal. Rptr. 681 (Dist. Ct. App.
1961).
10. 2 Page, Wills § 19.18 (Bowe-Parker rev. ed. 1960).
11. Caulfield v. Sullivan, 85 N.Y. 153 (1881); Tonnele v. Hall, 4 N.Y. 140 (1850).
12. 126 N.Y. 215, 28 N.E. 238 (1891).
13. Id. at 247-48, 28 N.E. at 242.
14. See Matter of Ivie, 4 N.Y.2d 178, 149 N.E.2d 725, 173 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1958) ; Matter
of Rausch, 258 N.Y. 327, 179 N.E. 755 (1932); Matter of Fowles, 222 N.Y. 222, 118 N.E.
611 (1918); Matter of Fowles, 176 App. Div. 637, 642, 163 N.Y. Supp. 873, 876 (1st Dep't
1917), all of which refer to a rule against incorporation by reference.
15. 2 Page, op. cit. supra note 10, at § 19.22; Samuels, supra note 4, at 278-79; Chaplin,
Incorporation by Reference, 2 Colum. L. Rev. 148, 150 (1902); Comment, 29 Fordham L.
Rev. 143, 144 (1960).
16. 111 N.Y. 410, 18 N.E. 718 (1888).
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deceased the testator and her will directed division of the amount she would take
under her father's will. The daughter's will was given effect not as a power of ap-
pointment, but as defining those persons and proportions to whom the daughter's
share should pass. This decision has been explained as a holding that when the
will of another party is involved, a special type of incorporation by reference is
present. 17 Comments on the case place great emphasis on the fact that such a
will is not totally dependent on testator's will but has an independent existence
of its own. Further, the formality attached to the execution of a will tends to
minimize the possibility of fraud. This special mode of incorporation exhibited
continued vitality in Matter of Fowles.'8 In this case, testator left property in
trust for life with a part of the remainder interest to be distributed pursuant to
the wife's will. Testator also provided that if both he and his wife died under
circumstances in which it could not be determined which party predeceased the
other, it was to be presumed that the testator had predeceased the wife. Both
the testator and his wife were lost on the Lusitania and it could not be deter-
mined which party was the survivor. In an opinion per Cardozo, J., the Court
held that there was a gift by implication to the legatees named in the wife's will
because the survivorship clause of the testator's will was held effective in avoiding
a lapse of the wife's power. The Court relied directly on Piffard as authority for
its decision. Addressing itself to the subject of incorporation by reference, the
Court noted, "It is plain, therefore, that we are not to press the rule against
incorporation to a 'drily logical extreme ... .' "19 It has been suggested that this
decision rests upon the idea that the wife's will was an independent act and was
not dependent on the will of the testator for its vitality. ° As in the Piffard case,
the attempted incorporation involved an extrinsic document which had been
executed with formalities tending to negate the possibility of fraud. The recep-
tiveness of the New York courts to a limited degree of incorporation was
seemingly apparent again in Matter of Rausc .2l In his will, testator gave one-
fifth of his residuary estate to a trust company in trust for his daughter under
terms of an agreement dated 1922, "which agreement is hereby made part of
this my will, as if fully set forth herein." 22 One highly relevant factor in this
case was that the trust was an inter vivos trust already in existence, and the
will sought only to add further property to the corpus of the trust. The bequest
to the trust was upheld, the Court reiterating that the doctrine against in-
corporation need not be carried to a drily logical extreme.
It is difficult to determine from the language of the Court whether the Rausch
case was based on incorporation by reference or independent legal significance.
17. Comment, 10 Fordham L. Rev. 82, 88-89 (1941).
18. 222 N.Y. 222, 118 N.E. 611 (1918).
19. Id. at 233, 118 N.E. at 613.
20. See Samuels, supra note 4, at 283; Evans, Incorporation by Reference, Integra-
tion, and Non-Testamentary Act, 25 Colum. L. Rev. 879, 900 (1925); 27 Yale LJ. 673, 676
(1917-18); contra, Scott, Trusts and the Statute of Wills, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 521, 552 (1930).
21. 258 N.Y. 327, 179 N.E. 755 (1932).
22. Id. at 330, 179 N.E. at 756.
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The trust agreement complied with all the requirements for a valid incorporation
by reference23 and it also had independent legal significance. 24 As a result of this
silence, some commentators have read the case as allowing incorporation by refer-
ence2 5 and others contend that independent legal significance was the rationale.20
One substantial argument in favor of the rationale of independent legal signifi-
cance in Rauschi rests upon the statement of the Court that, "Here the extrinsic
fact, identifying and explaining the gift already made, is as impersonal and en-
during as the inscription on a monument."27 This emphasis on the impersonality
of the document and its durability indicate that the independent existence of the
trust agreement was of the greatest importance. It can be further noted that
these qualities minimize the possibility of fraud.
Following the Rausch case, the New York lower courts upheld the use of
incorporation in cases involving inter vivos trusts where the settlor retained a
measure of control over the trust.2 8 Limitations upon the practice of using the
amendable or revocable inter vivos trust as a part of testamentary disposition
were presented in President & Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Ianowitz. 2
Testator reserved the power under the trust indenture to modify, amend, alter
or revoke the trust, in whole or in part.30 Not only was this power expressly
reserved, but testator had exercised it on four occasions; twice before execution
of the will; once immediately after execution of the will; and once two months
after execution of the will. While the lower court restricted the controlling terms
of the trust instrument to the first three amendments, the Appellate Division
invalidated the article of the will which contained the attempted incorporation
of the trust agreement. The court reasoned that permitting the trust to stand
after its final amendment would permit the testator to substantially alter his
will by use of an instrument which does not comply with the statutory stan-
dards.31 As to the contention that the trust had independent significance, it was
held that "the reservation of power to amend the trust indenture and its re-
peated exercise eliminated all independent significance that might be attached
23. Comment, supra note 15, at 146.
24. See 1 Scott, Trusts § 54.3 (2d ed. 1956).
25. Note, 17 Minn. L. Rev. 527, 535 (1933); Note, 50 Yale L.J. 342, 343-44 (1940);
Note, 9 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 507, 508 (1932).
26. Note, 21 Cornell L.Q. 492, 494 (1935); Note, 6 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 295, 303-04 (1932).
27. Matter of Rausch, 258 N.Y. 327, 332, 179 N.E. 755, 756 (1932).
28. See Matter of Tiffany, 157 Misc. 873, 285 N.Y. Supp. 971 (Surr. Ct. 1935) (where
testator reserved certain powers to himself but never exercised them); Matter of Bremer,
156 Misc. 160, 281 N.Y. Supp. 264 (Surr. Ct. 1935), aff'd on reargument, 157 Misc. 221,
283 N.Y. Supp. 159 (Surr. Ct. 1935) (where testatrix retained power to amend and did
amend prior to execution of the will).
29. 260 App. Div. 174, 21 N.Y.S.2d 232 (2d Dep't 1940).
30. Id. at 175, 21 N.Y.S.2d at 233.
31. N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 21. Were the post-execution amendments allowed to take
effect in -the Janowitz case, it would have presented a departure from the prior cases. With
the possibility of fraud always under consideration, the mere possibility alone may have
been sufficient to defeat the subsequent amendments. Further, the Appellate Division re-
fused to allow the trust to take effect by its terms prior to execution of the will on the
theory that this would frustrate the testator's intent.
452
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to the trust indenture."3 2 It should be noted that the opinion speaks of both
the power to amend and its exercise as defeating independent significance. A later
lower court opinion suggested that reservation of the power to amend an inter
vivos trust without actual exercise of that power may allow use of the inde-
pendent significance rationale.33 Another decision held that reservation and an
exercise of a reserved power over an extrinsic document prior to execution of
the will does not invalidate a reference to the trust.
4
Nevertheless, it was not until 1958 that the New York Court of Appeals shed
additional light on the cloudy status of incorporation by reference and indepen-
dent legal significance. This was done in Matter of Ivie 35 where testator and his
wife created the inter vivos trust in 1932 and reserved a power to amend the
trust. In 1941, prior to execution of the will, testator and his wife amended the
trust in such a way as to provide for a change of trustees in the future. After the
execution of the testator's will, the trust was again amended so that the prior
amendment was eliminated. A third and final amendment provided for the re-
linquishment of all power which the settlors had over the trust. Although the last
two amendments to the trust were made after the execution of the will, a bequest
from the testator to the trust was upheld. On the position of the rule against in-
corporation by reference, it was stated, "where the trust itself remains unimpaired
and substantially the same as it was at the time of the execution of the will, and
certainly where the amendments are concerned solely with the administrative
provisions of the trust deed, it cannot be said to come within the purview of the
rule against incorporation by reference."3 6 It was further commented, "we be-
lieve that as long as adequate safeguards3 7 are employed, the rule against in-
corporation by reference should not be carried to 'a drily logical extreme.' ))3
While the amendments were admittedly made for administrative purposes, the
Court appeared to indicate that the reference to the amended trust might have
been upheld even if the amendments were of a substantive nature. This is seen
in the statements that, "not every attempt to dispose of property by testa-
mentary reference to another instrument will be thwarted," and, "a will provi-
sion is not necessarily defeated although events may occur and documents may
32. President & Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 260 App. Div. 174, 179, 21
N.Y.S.2d 232, 237.
33. Matter of Tillman, 53 N.Y.S.2d 664 (Surr. Ct. 1945).
34. Matter of Snyder, 125 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Surr. Ct. 1953). The Janowitz case received
a barrage of criticism from many commentators. See, e.g., Niles, Trusts and Administration,
32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 433, 436 (1957); McClanahan, Bequests to an Existing Trust-Problems
and Suggested Remedies, 47 Calif. L. Rev. 267, 284 (1959) ; Scott, op. cit. supra note 24;
Note, 50 Yale L.J., supra note 25, at 348.
35. 4 N.Y.2d 178, 149 N.E.2d 725, 173 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1958). For the same case at
the lower court levels, see Matter of Ivie, 155 N.Y.S.2d 544 (Surr. Ct. 1956), aff'd 3 A.D.2d
914, 163 N.Y.S.2d 380 (2d Dep't 1957).
36. Id. at 182, 149 N.E.2d at 726, 173 N.Y.S.2d at 295.
37. This reference to adequate safeguards clearly shows that the major concern of the
Court is the possibility of fraud where there is a reference to an extrinsic document. As in
the prior cases, the negation of the possibility of fraud is emphasized. [Author's footnote].
38. Matter of Ivie, 4 N.Y.2d 178, 182, 149 N.E.2d 725, 726, 173 N.Y.S.2d 293, 295
(1958).
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be altered after the execution of the will determining either the identity of a
beneficiary or the amount of a bequest .... ,,19 As the extrinsic document had
been altered after the execution of the will, it is unlikely that the decision was
based on incorporation by reference. The better reasoning suggests that the
reference to the amended trust wasupheld on the basis of the trust having an
independent significance outside of the will.40
This progression of cases leads to the conclusion that New York actually
follows two rules regarding incorporation by reference. Where the extrinsic
document has independent legal significance, incorporation will be permitted on
the basis of that independent significance. Where the factor of independent
significance is not present, New York allows use of incorporation by reference
but limits such incorporation to situations where the possibility of fraud is
minimal. "While the New York courts have occasionally used language which
seemed hostile to the rule against incorporation, the actual adjudications are
what we would find in a state which recognized the rule."141 It is unfortunate
that the holding of the Booth case was interpreted by subsequent decisions to
state that New York does not allow incorporation by reference. Rather than
engage in this tortured approach to incorporation, there should be an express
acceptance of the doctrine of incorporation and its application limited to situa-
tions where the possibility of fraud is minimal.
The instant case serves to perpetuate the existing confusion over the status
of incorporation by reference in New York when the element of independent
legal significance is not present. Citing the Booth case, the Appellate Division
held that the undated and unattested letter could not be incorporated. 42 The
result could have been reached merely by application of the general require-
ments for a valid incorporation to the extrinsic document in the case. Had this
been done, the document would have been excluded on the basis of failure to
comply with the requirements. No reference was made to the letter's existence
at the time of execution of the will. 43 The opinion gives no indication that the
letter was in existence at the time of execution. 44 The document did not cor-
respond to the description in the will as it was not found where testator declared
39. Id. at 181-82, 149 N.E.2d at 726, 173 N.Y.S.2d at 294-95.
40. See Scott, op. cit. supra note 24, at § 54.3. But see Atkinson, Succession, 34 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 490, 500 (1959), which suggests that the decision' in Ivie was based on incorporation
by reference. A lower court decision apparently reading Matter of Ivie in terms of incor-
poration by reference is Matter of Furst, 27 Misc. 2d 589, 213 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Surr. Ct. 1961).
New York has recently taken a major step in sanctioning the use of the trust in conjunction
with the will by enactment of Deced. Est. Law § 47-g. The statute explicitly refers to trusts
which are amendable or revocable. Especially noteworthy is § 47-g(d) which provides that
a devise, bequest, or appointment shall be valid even though the trust instrument was not
executed in the manner required by Deced. Est. Law § 21.
41. 2 Page, op. cit. supra note 10, at § 19.22.
42. Matter of Salmon, 24 A.D.2d 962, 265 N.Y.S.2d 373, 374 (1st Dep't 1965).
43. Wagner v. Clauson, 399 I1. 403, 78 N.E.2d 203 (1948); Matter of McNamara's
Estate, 119 Cal. App. 2d 744, 260 P.2d 182 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953).
44. Bircher v. Wasson, 133 Ind. App. 27, 180 N.E.2d 118 (1962); Montgomery v.
Blankenship, 217 Ark. 357, 230 S.W.2d 51 (1960); Kellom v. Beverstock, 100 N.H. 329,
126 A.2d 127 (1956).
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it would be found.45 These infirmities would result in the denial of incorpora-
tion in virtually all jurisdictions. By its failure to note the true status of in-
corporation by reference in New York, the decision in the instant case allows
this formal rule against incorporation by reference, born in dictum and per-
petuated in exceptions, to continue its unneeded existence in New York law.
As the attempted incorporation in the instant case failed, the remaining
question was whether the property mentioned in the article should pass to the
niece under the theory of a failure of directions or pass through the residuary0
clause. In its opinion, the Surrogate's Court held that the niece was entitled
to take the property for herself only in the absence of any directions what-
soever. Purporting to effectuate the testator's intent, the court reasoned that
since the testator left directions, he did not intend that the property should pass
to the niece absolutely. However, the Appellate Division held that the letter
of directions cannot be given effect. There being a legal failure of directions,
the niece took absolutely under the provision of the article covering failure of
directions.
It is submitted that the distinction between physical absence and legal ab-
sence of directions should not have been of paramount importance in the case.
Rather, emphasis should have been placed on what the testator intended by
the entire clause of the will. While it is probable that testator never envisioned
the directions being denied effect because of legal infirmities, this does not pre-
vent ascertainment of his intent. At the time of the execution of the will,
testator was uncertain if any parties outside of the niece should be left certain
articles. Despite his indecision as to these other parties, it is clear that testator
desired to have the niece take absolutely if no other parties were later desig-
nated. Permitting the articles to pass to the niece does not frustrate testator's
intent since he was aware of this possibility and even provided that the niece
should take absolutely if there were no other takers. The language of the will
reveals that testator was establishing his preference that those who might be
named in the letter of directions should be his first choice to take and then
designating his niece as his second choice. The parties designated in the letter
cannot take due to the infirmities in the document which prevent its incorpora-
tion. Testator's first preference thus eliminated, his intent can best be effectu-
ated by allowing the property to pass to his next-designated choice. In reading
the clause in this manner, a result is reached which is consistent both with
testator's intent and with the language of the will.
PAUL E. RUDNICKI
45. Matter of Smith's Estate, 196 Cal. App. 2d 544, 16 Cal. Rptr. 681 (Dist. Ct. App.
1961).
